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IMMIGRATION LAW-DEPORTING ALIENS IN ABSENTIA: BAL­
ANCING THE ALIEN'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT VERSUS THE COURT'S 
NEED TO AVOID UNNECESSARY DELAYS 
INTRODUCTION 
When will an illegal alien, out on bail pending a deportation hear­
ing, and living in a distant city, be denied due process by a deportation 
hearing held in absentia? Imagine a political refugee crosses our bor­
der, is detained, and ordered to show cause why he should not be de­
ported. Having no real defense, he admits deportability, and is 
released on bail pending a trial on his petition for political asylum. He 
then relocates. Despite the location of counsel and witnesses near his 
new home, and the costs of traveling back for trial, his change of 
venue requests are denied. When he fails to appear, he is deported, 
and thereby denied the opportunity to present his arguments for 
asylum. 
This Note examines in absentia deportation hearings.! Section I 
begins with an examination of the judicial definition of a deportable 
alien's rights prior to 1952 and then discusses the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952,2 an historical statute that defined those 
rights. The Note focuses on section 242(b) of the Act, the alien's right 
to be present at the hearing and the government's authority to proceed 
against those who are inexcusably absent. Section 242(b) has been un­
changed by subsequent legislation, and remains the basis for the law in 
this area. Section II examines the proper scope of section 242(b). Ini­
tially, Section II analyzes change of venue and continuance motions 
since the denial of these motions frequently precedes the alien's failure 
to appear. Maldonado-Perez v. INS3 is a recent example of an alien 
1. Deportation is a governmental action taken to expel someone who is illegally in 
this country. Deportation hearings should be distinguished from exclusion proceedings, 
where the government acts against those detained before they ever cross the border. De­
portable aliens have a constitutional guarantee of due process under the fourteenth amend­
ment, excludable aliens do not. See United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as 
far as an alien denied entry is concerned."). This Note focuses exclusively on aliens' rights 
in the deportation process, in particular, the right to be present at the hearing. 
2. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C. and various other titles). 
3. 865 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
269 
270 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:269 
deported in absentia after a denial of his change of venue request. The 
court's analysis of the issues in Maldonado-Perez are examined in de­
tail. Section III explores the overriding judicial "fairness" require­
ment for deportation proceedings, and whether that requirement is 
met in in absentia deportations. Finally, this Note recommends that 
courts consider the differing interests of political refugees from other 
deportable aliens. Specifically, it suggests that a series of short contin­
uances or one change of venue should be liberally granted before the 
court utilizes its in absentia deportation authority. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. Immigration Law Prior to 1952 
The immigration policy of this country began as one of encour­
agement.4 In frontier America, crops needed to be harvested, and rail­
roads built.s Until 1875, there were no laws restricting immigration, 
with the exception of a two-year period in 1798 when an unpopular 
law allowed direct Presidential deportation of dangerous aliens. 6 
In 1875, Congress began defining the number and nationalities of 
those who would be permitted to immigrate to the United States. Pro­
fessor Elizabeth Hull has chronicled these restrictions,7 many of which 
were based in the "scientific racism" of the time.8 The first restrictive 
law was aimed at Chinese and Japanese immigrants, large numbers of 
whom had come to work on the railroads for minimal wages.9 The 
cultural differences and language barriers between the immigrants and 
American citizens led to fear and anger, and eventually to claims that 
as a race, Asians were prone to prostitution and crime.lO Conse­
quently, Congress passed a series of Chinese Exclusion Acts that sus­
pended the immigration of Chinese laborers. l1 Not surprisingly, the 
4. H.R. REp. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1952 u.s. CoDE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1655; Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 
CoLUM. L. REv. I, 2 (1984) (referring to this time period as the stage of liberalism). 
5. E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 8 (1985). 
6. H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 4, at 7, reprinted in 1952 u.s. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1655-56. 
7. E. HULL, supra note 5. 
8. Id. at 14 ("Influenced by the theory of evolution and the social Darwinism of 
Herbert Spencer, [scientific racism] consisted of 'highly questionable assumptions' ...."); 
see also Schuck, supra note 4, at 3 (referring to this time period as the stage of "restrictive 
nationalism"). 
9. H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 4, at II, reprinted in 1952 u.S. CODE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1660. 
10. E. HULL, supra note 5, at 11. 
11. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 4, at 11-12, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1660-61, for a more complete history. In The Chinese Ex­
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Supreme Court's early opinions on aliens' rights involved Chinese and 
Japanese immigrants. The Court began by examining the aliens' 
claims that they were entitled to protection by the Constitution. In 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,12 the Court held that aliens are persons within 
the meaning and protection of the fourteenth amendment to the Con­
stitution. Later, the Court expanded that decision in The Japanese 
Immigrant Case,13 holding that it violated due process to "arbitrarily 
... cause an alien, who has entered the country [illegally] ... to be 
taken into custody and deported without giving him all [sic] opportu­
nity to be heard . ..."14 For the first time, aliens had a guarantee of 
some due process, although in the absence of any statutory protection, 
these cases were the extent of those rights. Despite these gains, in 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States,15 the Court held that deportation pro­
ceedings are civil, not criminal in nature, and therefore the scope of 
procedural protections would be narrowed accordingly.16 
Although judicial decree declares that deportation hearings are 
civil proceedings, the risks to an alien in a deportation hearing, such as 
potential loss of life, property, and separation from family, closely par­
allel the risks to criminal defendants. 17 Perhaps for this reason, by 
1915, the courts had expanded principles of procedural fairness to de­
portation hearings. In Whitfield v. Hanges,18 the court stated that 
"the accused shall be notified of the nature of the charge ... shall have 
[] an opportunity to be heard . . . cross-examine the witnesses . . . 
produce evidence and witnesses to refute ... [and] the decision shall 
not be without substantial evidence taken at the hearing to support 
it."19 Whitfield provided a clear expression ofjudicial intent to require 
significant procedural protections before any deportation order is 
upheld. 
Two years later, Congress passed the Immigration and National­
ity Act of 1917,20 the first legislative attempt to broadly define immi­
elusion Case, the Supreme Court observed "[t]hat the government of the United States ... 
can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to contro­
versy." 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889). 
12. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
13. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
14. Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
15. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
16. Id. at 730. For a criticism of that distinction, see Schuck, supra note 4, at 24-27. 
However, Schuck later concedes that the distinction may be necessary to avoid overloading 
the immigration system. Id. at 68. 
17. Schuck, supra note 4, at 24-27. 
18. 222 F. 745 (8th Cir. 1915). 
19. Id. at 749. 
20. ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1181 (1988». 
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gration policy. Despite Congress' intent to further restrict 
immigration,21 the courts did not interpret the 1917 Act as changing 
the basic protections afforded aliens in Whitfield. 22 In fact, the 
Supreme Court expanded on those 'requirements, holding in Bridges v. 
Wixon 23 that the process itself must also be fundamentally fair. Jus­
tice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated that "[w]e are dealing here 
with procedural requirements prescribed for the protection of the 
alien. . . . Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by 
which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of 
fairness. "24 
The 1917 Act, as amended, remained the foundation of immigra­
tion law in this country until 1952, despite a groundswell of criticism 
in legal periodicals and at congressional hearings.2s These attacks 
were aimed at the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), 
but came at a time when other administrative agencies were also re­
buked for similar adjUdicative problems.26 Both the courts and com­
mentators criticized the INS for the unfairness of its deportation 
procedures. The Supreme Court interjected its own view, holding in 
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath 27 that deportation hearings should be 
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.28 The Adminis­
trative Procedure Act applied to all administrative agencies, and re­
21. H.R. REp. No. 1365, supra note 4, at 15-16, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CoDE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1665 (The Act "added to the inadmissible classes aliens who are 
illiterate, persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority, men, as well as women, enter­
ing for immoral purposes, chronic alcoholics, stowaways, vagrants, and persons who had a 
previous attack of insanity."). 
22. See Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 336 
(1932). 
23. 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
24. Id. at 154; see also Barthold v. INS, 517 F.2d 689, 691 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[W]e 
analyze the proceedings in terms of their fundamental fairness on a case-by-case basis. "); cf 
Aalund v. Marshall, 461 F.2d 710,714 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[O]ur role in this type of proceed­
ing is not to consider the fundamental fairness of the result, but only to consider the under­
lying fairness of the hearing in terms of the statutory scheme and the constitution."). 
The fairness of Immigration and Naturalization Service procedures used to deport 
aliens is to be determined by balancing the personal risks to the alien and risks of erroneous 
deportation against the government's interest in the current procedure and the probable 
value of changing procedures. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
25. See Gordon, Due Process ofLaw in Immigration Proceedings, 50 A.B.A. J. 34 n.8 
(1964) (listing six authorities criticizing the INS deportation process); see also Wong Yang 
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950) (outlining some of the historical criticisms and hold­
ing that INS procedures in deportation violated the alien's rights). 
26. See generally H.R. REp. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1195. 
27. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
28. ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988». 
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sponded to due process criticisms. In Wong Yang Sung, the Court 
held that "the administrative hearing [in this case is] a perfect exem­
plification of the practices so unanimously condemned [in the Act] .... 
We find no basis ... for judicially declaring an exemption in favor of 
deportation proceedings . . . . "29 
By 1949, Congress had begun re-writing the immigration laws. 
In revising the law, one of its proclaimed objectives was to delineate 
the scope of procedural rights afforded to aliens.30 First, reversing the 
Wong Yang Sung decision, Congress enacted legislation that exempted 
deportation proceedings from the scope of the Administrative Proce­
dure Act. 31 Congress then passed section 242(b) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952. Section B of this Note will examine the 
language of that section and the specific due process required before a 
deportation order is considered "fundamentally fair." 
B. Section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,32 known popu­
larly as the McCarran Act, constituted a major overhaul of American 
immigration law.33 It proclaimed seven basic changes to the 1917 law, 
including provisions "for fair administrative practice and proce­
dure."34 That meant, inter alia, that aliens must be afforded an oppor­
tunity to be present at their deportation hearings. Specifically, section 
242(b) of the Act states, in part: 
Determination of deportability in any case shall be made only upon 
a record made in a proceeding . . . at which the alien shall have 
reasonable opportunity to be present . ... If any alien has been given 
a reasonable opportunity to be present ... and without reasonable 
29. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 45, 52. 
30. H.R. REp. No. 1365, supra note 4, at 28, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1679. 
31. Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 843, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048 
(1950), repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 
§ 403(a)(47), 66 Stat. 163, 280. 
32. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C. and various other titles). 
33. Like its predecessors, the 1952 Act empowered the Justice Department with the 
authority to enforce the Act. The Justice Department, in tum, established the INS as the 
agency responsible for delineating policy derived from the immigration laws. Many of 
these procedUres are set out in 8 C.F.R. (1990). For a complete overview of the depart­
ments and agencies involved in immigration law, see Legomsky, Forum Choices for the 
Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 
1297, 1303-10 (1986). 
34. H.R. REp. No: 1365, supra note 4, at 28, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CoDE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1679. 
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cause fails or refuses to attend . . . the special inquiry officer may 
proceed to a determination in like manner as if the alien were 
present.3S 
Congress added the in absentia provision, which allows an immigra­
tion law judge to deport an absent alien who, without reasonable 
cause, fails to attend the hearing. The provision was added because 
the deportation process had frequently been "interrupted and sub­
jected to unnecessary delays because aliens, without legitimate cause, 
refused to attend scheduled hearings or insisted upon leaving at their 
own pleasure and without other than contumacious reasons. The 
Government should have authority to proceed to a final decision in the 
face of such obstructionist tactics."36 Section 242(b) was designed to 
incorporate into one document the basic requirements of fair process 
dictated by Whitfield,37 Bridges,38 and Wong Yang Sung,39 and elimi­
nate the administrative practices criticized in Wong Yang Sung.40 One 
court commented: 
[Section 242(b) is] the first explicit statement ofthe requirement ofa 
hearing in deportation proceedings and due process requires that 
the respondent in a deportation hearing receive timely notice; that 
he have an opportunity to be heard, to cross-examine witnesses 
against him, and to produce evidence; that the decision be based on 
the evidence and only on the evidence produced at the hearing; and 
that the decision be supported by substantial evidence.41 
In an early interpretation of section 242(b), the Supreme Court 
required that the proceeding follow not only the statute, but also all 
written INS procedures.42 Otherwise, the proceeding was a per se vio­
lation of due process.43 However, the Court later limited that require­
ment to procedures that protected the alien's constitutional rights.44 
35. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran) Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) 
(1988) (emphasis added). 
36. H.R. REp. No. 1365, supra note 4, at 28, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1653, 1679. 
37. Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 F. 745 (8th Cir. 1915). 
38. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
39. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
40. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
41. United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1975). 
42. United States ex reL Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (sometimes 
referred to as the "Accardi Doctrine"). The INS is the agency responsible for establishing 
the procedures which are followed when dealing with aliens. See supra note 33. 
43. Accardi, 347 U.S. at 260. 
44. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755 (1979) (only where a parties' consti­
tutional rights are at issue must the federal agency follow procedures established to protect 
those rights). In Jarecha v. INS, the Fifth Circuit stated: 
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The statute grants the responsibility for ensuring that procedures are 
fairly administered to a "special inquiry officer."4S Now referred to as 
immigration judges, these officials are individuals who are otherwise 
not involved in the investigation or prosecution of the alien.46 The 
immigration judge determines the alien's deportability. The alien may 
seek review by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"),47 and has 
the right to a federal court appeal after exhausting all administrative 
remedies.48 Mere error, however, is insufficient to overturn an Immi­
gration Court decision. Rather, the alien must establish that the error 
caused substantial prejudice to his claim.49 Two errors often alleged 
to cause such harm are a judge's denial of motions for change of 
[W]here administrative discretion is exercised without the guidance of regula­
tions, ... the requirements of due process (aside from the requirements of notice, 
fair hearing, etc.) are met if the written decision of the administrative agency or 
the record of the administrative hearing set out clearly the ground which forms 
the basis for the denial of discretionary relief, so that the appellate bodies within 
the agency and the reviewing courts are able to ascertain whether [the] decision is 
arbitrary, capricious or not supported by the "reasonable, substantial and proba­
tive evidence on the record considered as a whole". 
417 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1969). 
45. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran) Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) 
(1988). 
46. Prior to the enactment of section 242(b), the INS had been severely criticized by 
several groups for permitting those involved in compiling the evidence against the alien to 
also act as interpreter, court stenographer, and final adjudicator of his claim. See supra 
note 25. Yet, the Supreme Court upheld this INS practice despite the opportunity for 
con1l.icting interests. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302,.311 (1955) (referring to this 
policy as an acceptable past practice to illustrate that it is not unfair to have both the 
immigration judge and the INS under the same administrative control). 
Despite the Supreme Court approval, commentators continued to criticize a structure 
that allowed the INS to adjudicate a case before an immigration judge who is part of the 
same agency. See Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN 
DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1980) (The author, a retired chairman of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, discussed the problems inherent in the system and the con1l.icts of the INS being 
both an enforcement and adjudicatory agency.). 
In 1983, immigration judges were finally removed from the INS and put under the 
auspice of the Executive Office for Immigration Review. 
47. The BIA is a five-member review panel within the Department of Justice. It is 
provided for in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1990). The BIA reviews exclusion and deportation determi­
nations made by immigration courts. Decisions relating to visas, extensions of stays, and 
other less significant matters are made by INS District Directors. For an overview of the 
agencies involved and their respective roles, see generally Legomsky, supra note 33, at 
1302-12. 
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988). 
49. Ka Fung Chan v. INS, 634 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir. 1981); Antolos v. INS, 402 
F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[T]he function of this court is limited to insuring that this 
discretion is not abused, and that petitioner has been afforded a full and fair hearing that 
comports with due process."). 
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venueSO and continuance.Sl In cases where the alien is eventually de­
ported in absentia, these motions have usually been made and subse­
quently denied before the alien failed to appear. The next Section of 
this Note will examine when these motions should be granted or de­
nied, before examining when in absentia proceedings are justified by 
the Act. 
II. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE· 
A. Continuances and Change of Venue Requests 
"It is understandable that an alien who is clearly deportable and 
ineligible for any relief from deportation should want to defer his en­
forced departure as long as possible ... ."S2 Congress expressed con­
cern that aliens would use their statutory rights to cause unreasonable 
delay.s3 Nevertheless, the courts have been concerned about overreac­
tion to that threat. "[A] myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the 
face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend 
with counsel an empty formality."s4 Change of venue requests and 
continuance motions are two mechanisms that some aliens use to de­
lay their deportation, although the INS does recognize the legitimacy 
of some requests. 5S 
Venue is originally established wherever the alien resides or is ar­
rested. S6 The immigration judge may grant reasonable change of 
venue motions for "good cause."S7 A change of venue motion has 
been considered reasonable when it ensured that an alien was afforded 
his right to be represented by counsel,58 or to present witnesses to sup­
50. 8 C.F.R. § 3.19 (1990). 
51. Id. § 3.27. 
52. Roberts, supra note 46, at 15 n.6O; see also Schuck, supra note 4, at 76-17 (dis­
cussing how aliens attempt to "beat the system"). 
53. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
54. Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Ungar v. 
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964». 
55. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.19, 3.27 (1990). 
56. Id. § 3. 19(a); see La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686,689 n.9 (2d Cir. 1969). Resi­
dence of the alien is the preferable alternative for establishing venue. See 3 C. GORDON, H. 
ROSENFIELD & S. MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.6(c) (1990). 
57. 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(b) (1990). 
58. Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988) (alien prevented from be­
ing represented by counsel who practiced in another jurisdiction); see also Chlomos v. INS, 
516 F.2d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[P]etitioner's difficulty in securing his lawyer's presence 
at the hearing was complicated by the fact that the government chose to have the hearing in 
Florida rather than in New Jersey."). In both Castro-O'Ryan and Chlomos, the alien had 
retained counsel in another jurisdiction, and identified and willing witnesses were not able 
to travel to the distant location. 
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port his claim. S9 The courts, faced with the burdens of an increasing 
caseload,60 will not grant a change of venue without evidence of need. 
Yet, as one court stated, the "aliens' statutory rights in deportation 
proceedings must be respected and . . . the desire for expeditious 
handling of immigration cases cannot, in itself, justify the evisceration 
of those rights."61 
Motions for continuance are also at the discretion of the immigra­
tion judge.62 Again, it is considered to be an abuse of discretion to 
refuse reasonable delays that, in effect, deny the alien representation63 
or prevent him from presenting testimony.64 While judges may grant 
continuances on their own motions, this seldom occurs. The burden is 
usually on the alien to establish that further time is necessary.6S If 
either or both of these procedural motions are denied, and the alien 
fails to appear, the court is faced with the question ofthe fairness of an 
in absentia deportation proceeding. 
B. In Absentia Hearings 
Section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
specifically grants the immigration court authority to proceed in ab­
sentia-"in like manner as if the alien were present."66 "Manifestly, 
this is an extreme power, and its use ... justified only in the event of 
aggravated defiance."67 The constitutionality of in absentia deporta­
59. United States ex reL Vermiglio v. Butterfield, 223 F.2d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1955) 
(court found no abuse because it determined the alien was not prevented from presenting 
witnesses). 
60. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
61. Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 93 (9th Cir. 1988). 
62. 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1990) ("The Immigration Judge may grant a motion for contin­
uance for good cause shown."). 
63. Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1985) (two continuances, each of one 
additional day, did not allow alien sufficient time to locate counsel and have counsel pre­
pare for hearing); see also Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he 
immigration judge should have acted sua sponte to continue the hearing and give Castro­
Nuno a chance to locate his counsel."); cf Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806-07 (5th Cir. 
1986) (denial of continuance was not abuse where attorney had one week to prepare for 
uncomplicated case). 
64. Matter of Namio, 14 I. & N. Dec. 412, 415-16 (1973). 
65. 8 C.F.R. § 242.13 (1990) ("[T]he Immigration Judge may grant a reasonable 
adjournment either at his or her own instance or, for good cause shown, upon application 
by the respondent or the Service."). 
66. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran) Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) 
(1988). 
67. 3 C. GORDON, H. ROSENFIELD & S. MAILMAN, supra note 56, § 5.9(e). Despite 
the extremeness of the power, immigration courts have increasingly begun utilizing section 
242(b). See id. at 5-107 (Supp. 1990). 
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tion hearings was upheld several years ago in Shah v. INS.68 In Shah, 
the court held that these hearings are not a per se violation of due 
process.69 
Section 242(b) provides three prerequisites that must occur before 
in absentia rulings can be made: 1) there must be a reasonable oppor­
tunity for the alien to be present; 2) there must be no reasonable cause 
why the alien is absent; and 3) the court must proceed in like manner 
as if the alien were present. 70 The first prerequisite, opportunity to be 
present, has generally been held to require proper notice of the depor­
tation hearing to the alien.71 Notice is proper when served personally 
or by mail on the alien's address,72 or to his attorney.73 Past INS 
regulations had required a seven-day notice, although shorter notice 
was allowed when the government could show it was in the public 
interest.74 However, even when notice is insufficient and the alien is 
absent, the deportation order will not be overturned unless the alien 
can also show actual substantial prejudice caused by his absence.7s 
The second criterion, reasonable cause for being absent, is re­
viewed on a case-by-case basis and eludes a definitive test. However, 
the sufficiency of some common excuses has been determined. For 
example, absence when a continuance or change of venue is unexpect­
edly denied is not sufficient cause.76 Reliance on counsel's advice not 
68. 788 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1986); see United States v. Dekermenjian, 508 F.2d 812 
(9th Cir. 1974). 
69. Shah, 788 F.2d at 972. 
70. See Immigration and Nationality (McCarran) Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) 
(1988) (emphasis added). 
71. Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1986) (alien and his attorney had notice 
and clear warnings of the possibility of an in absentia hearing if they failed to appear). 
72. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran) Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) 
(1988) ("rrJhe alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances, of the 
nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which the proceedings will 
be held."). Since 1956, regulations have required the alien to be served with an order to 
show cause, which states the charges as well as serves notice of the hearing date. See 8 
C.F.R. § 242.1 (1990). If the alien is served by mail and does not appear or acknowledge 
receipt in writing, personal service is required. 8 C.F.R. § 242. 1 (c) (1990). 
73. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(a) (1990). 
74. A predecessor to 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (1990) contained specific language requiring a 
seven-day notice and allowing the notice period to be abbreviated. Both references no 
longer appear, but the governmental authority to hasten the proceeding apparently contin­
ues. See Matter of Santos, 191. & N. Dec. 2969 (June 26, 1984) (deportation order upheld, 
despite being conducted within two days of the alien's arrest; haste was justified because 
immigration judge only sat in that jurisdiction quarterly). 
75. Ibrahim v. INS, 821 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987) (alien apparently showed 
he had insufficient notice, but failed to show he was prejudiced by not being present). 
76. Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1986); accord Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 
865 F.2d 328, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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to attend is also insufficient. 77 
The third requirement for a deportation hearing in absentia, that 
of proceeding in like manner, assures that the alien's deportation is 
based on the merits and on substantial evidence.78 This precludes a 
summary judgment, and requires the government to present evidence 
and prove deportability even when the alien is absent. When these 
three criteria have been met, the Board of Immigration Appeals has 
upheld the immigration court's order of deportation, despite the in 
absentia nature of the proceeding.79 The decision in Maldonado-Perez 
v. INS 80 is an example of the recent trend of deporting aliens in absen­
tia. In a narrow sense, the alien is challenging a venue ruling; more 
generally, he is testing the accepted meaning of "an opportunity to be 
present," and the fairness of in absentia deportations. The next Sec­
tion will examine the facts ofMaldonado-Perez and analyze the major­
ity and dissenting opinions, in order to explore the rationale for 
justifying the use of this extreme power. 
C. 	 Maldonado-Perez v. INS 
1. 	 Facts and Decision of the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia 
Pablo Maldonado-Perez was an illegal alien from EI Salvador 
who was apprehended by INS officials one day after entering the 
United States near Brownsville, Texas. He retained local Texas coun­
sel, and at the "order to show cause" hearing the following day, he 
conceded deportability. He then requested a stay of that order pend­
ing his application for political asylum.81 He was released on bond, 
and relocated to Washington, D.C. to be closer to family and his sup­
port network. Several months later, he and his Texas counsel were 
notified of a court date to determine the merits of his asylum claim. 
Shortly thereafter, that date was accelerated from fifteen months to 
two months, and the local Texas counsel attempted unsuccessfully to 
have venue transferred to Washington.82 One week prior to the sched­
77. Patel, 803 F.2d at 806; see also Matter of S--, 7 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531 (1957) 
(aliens had no reasonable cause for absence when they failed to attend because counsel 
advised them that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction). 
78. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran) Act § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. ~ 1252(b)(4) 
(1988) ("[N]o decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence. "). 
79. See Matter of Perez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 3023 (Mar. 13, 1987); Matter of Marallag, 
13 I. & N. Dec. 775 (1971). 
80. 	 865 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
81. 	 Id. at 330. 
82. 	 Id. 
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uled hearing, and overburdened with cases himself, the Texas attorney 
finally located Washington counsel to represent Maldonado-Perez at 
the Texas hearing. After several discussions between the new Wash­
ington counsel and INS officials in Texas, the attorney believed a 
change of venue motion would be supported by the INS, and he sub­
mitted the motion by mail.83 That motion was presented to the court 
twelve minutes before the hearing began.84 The court determined that 
the alien had failed to appear, that Texas counsel of record was absent, 
and that the Washington counsel's request for change of venue was 
untimely and therefore denied.8s The court stated that local rules re­
quired such motions be submitted five days in advance in order to give 
the INS time to respond.86 The court recessed until its afternoon ses­
sion to await appearances by anyone involved, and thereafter pro­
ceeded, in absentia, to deport the alien based on the stipulated facts 
conceded after his arrest.87 Maldonado-Perez appealed to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the deportation order.88 He 
then petitioned the federal court of appeals. 
2. 	 Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia 
a. 	 Opportunity to be Present 
Maldonado-Perez's first allegation was that he had been denied 
an opportunity to be present at the hearing by virtue of the denial of 
his reasonable change of venue requests. He relied on Baires v. INS,89 
where a federal court of appeals vacated a deportation order after the 
immigration judge had refused to grant a reasonable change of 
venue.90 That denial deprived the alien from presenting witnesses that 
would substantiate his claim for asylum. Maldonado-Perez argued 
that he, too, had been denied a reasonable change of venue, and that 
his interests had been substantially prejudiced. He argued that be­
cause his counsel of choice and witnesses were located elsewhere, he 
had been denied the opportunity to be present to make his claim. 
The majority of the justices of the court of appeals held that the 
83. 	 /d. at 331. 
84. Id. On appeal, Washington counsel contended that an appearance slip to repre­
sent Maldonado-Perez also accompanied the motion. Id. at 340 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
85. 	 Id. 
86. 	 Id. 
87. 	 Id. 
88. 	 Id. 
89. 	 856 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1988). 
90. 	 Id. at 93. 
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deportation in absentia was warranted because 1) Maldonado-Perez 
had an opportunity to be present; and 2) no reasonable excuse for his 
absence was proven. The court of appeals determined that Maldo­
nado-Perez had a reasonable opportunity to be present due to the no­
tice he received regarding the trial date. Both he and his Texas 
counsel had two months' notice, and his Washington counsel had at 
least one week's notice. While the court admitted that one week was 
less than desirable, it held that this length of time was sufficient.91 
The majority distinguished Baires from the present situation. In 
Baires, the alien had three named witnesses, whereas Maldonado­
Perez had no identified witnesses. In Baires, the request for a change 
of venue was timely, as compared to the request made twelve minutes 
before the hearing was to begin in Maldonado-Perez. Finally, and 
most importantly according to the majority, the alien in Baires was 
ultimately present at his hearing despite his indigence and the limited 
notice he had received. 
Instead, the majority relied on Patel v. INS,92 where an alien ac­
cused of overstaying his visa was deported in absentia. Just as in Mal­
donado-Perez, the alien's attorney was retained one week before the 
scheduled hearing. Patel had requested and was denied a continuance, 
but believing it would be granted, he and his attorney failed to appear. 
The court in Patel, like the majority in Maldonado-Perez, held that 1) 
the alien had been given an opportunity to be present; and 2) reliance 
on continuance or venue motions before they are granted does not ex­
cuse the alien or the attorney for failing to appear.93 Since the statu­
tory criteria of section 242(b) were met, the Patel court upheld the in 
absentia deportation. 
b. Excusable Absence 
Maldonado-Perez's second argument on appeal was that his ab­
sence was excusable, thus negating the court's authority to proceed in 
absentia. He pointed to the extreme distance from his current resi­
dence to the court, and the expense of traveling back to the forum. He 
claimed that the denial of his two change of venue motions constituted 
prejudicial error. 
The court of appeals held that it was not abuse of discretion for 
91. Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 334 (relying on Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804 (5th 
Cir. 1986»; see also Olvera v. INS, 504 F.2d 1372, 1374 (5th Cir. 1974) (three days was 
sufficient time for substitute counsel in an uncomplicated case). 
92. 803 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1986). 
93. Id. at 806. 
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the immigration judge to deny the change of venue motions. Accord­
ing to the court, his inconvenient distance from the courthouse was 
self-induced, and if he was resourceful enough to get to Washington, 
he must be equally capable of traveling back. The court reviewed a list 
of nine circumstances the alien claimed justified the change of venue. 
In addition to the distance from the courthouse, the circumstances 
included his indigence, unfamiliarity with the law, and the unavailabil­
ity of counsel of his choice in the original venue. The court discounted 
each claim individually. Although it noted that some of the reasons 
may at times constitute "good cause,"94 the claims were insufficient to 
prove abuse of discretion, and the court, therefore, would not overturn 
the venue ruling.9s The court concluded that Maldonado-Perez 
lacked a sufficient cause for his absence. Having found that he had a 
reasonable opportunity to be present and lacked sufficient cause for his 
absence, the majority upheld the deportation order.96 
c. Dissent 
Chief Judge Wald dissented for two reasons. First, she argued 
that section 242(b) did not justify an in absentia deportation based on 
the facts of this case. She disagreed that sufficient notice of the trial 
date fulfilled the requirement of a reasonable opportunity to be pres­
ent.97 She concluded that the legislative history of section 242(b) indi­
cated that in absentia proceedings were inserted into the statute for 
extreme situations, specifically to combat obstructive tactics by 
aliens.98 Unless there is evidence of obstructive motives, aliens should 
be provided a real opportunity to be present and to make their claim. 
Judge Wald reviewed the facts from Maldonado-Perez's arrest to his 
deportation, and determined that the requests for change of venue 
were proper and not made to delay the proceeding unnecessarily.99 
While a court's administrative concern may be an appropriate factor 
in denying such motions, she determined that here, the immigration 
94. Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 337; see 8 C.F.R. § 3. 19(b) (1990) ("The Immigra­
tion Judge, for good cause, may change venue ....") (emphasis added). 
95. Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 337. 
96. Id. The third requirement, of proceeding in like manner, was apparently not in 
question. The court had noted that the petitioner was deported based upon the "record as 
constituted." Id. at 331 (quoting the hearing transcript at 3). 
97. Id. at 339 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("The legislative history clearly shows, however, 
that Congress intended 'opportunity' to mean more than mere 'notice.' "). Judge Wald 
went on to note that Congress provided for notice separately from the provisions dealing 
with opportunity to be present. Id. at 339 n.3. 
98. Id.; see supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
99. Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 338 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
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judge was too inflexible. loo Without more than standard administra­
tive concerns, and faced with the harsh result of denying this alien's 
request, she stated that the court abused its discretion in denying these 
motions. 10l Consequently, Maldonado-Perez could not be deported in 
absentia under the statute, because he had been denied a reasonable 
opportunity to be present. 
Judge Wald termed the majority's reliance on Patel 102 "oos­
placed."103 Patel was accused of twice overstaying a visa. He made 
no claim of political asylum. Patel had petitioned for a continuance 
for unsubstantiated reasons, not for a change of venue because counsel 
and witnesses were located elsewhere. 104 The facts in Patel pointed to 
an alien utilizing delaying tactics to once again avoid deportation. 
Judge Wald agreed that Congress intended that aliens like Patel 
should be tried in absentia, but contended that the facts ofMaldonado­
Perez were so dissimilar from those of Patel that Patel did not control 
Maldonado-Perez. 105 
Judge Wald's second reason for dissenting was that denying the 
venue change effectively denied Maldonado-Perez an opportunity to 
be represented by the counsel of his choice. 106 The majority passed 
over that issue, except to acknowledge that the right to counsel is pro­
vided for in the immigration statute. 107 The majority never applied 
that section of the statute to the facts of this case. Judge Wald, how­
ever, compared this case to Castro-O'Ryan,108 where the Court of Ap­
peals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a deportation order. The Castro­
O'Ryan court held that a denial of a change of venue motion prevented 
that alien from being represented by counsel. Although Castro­
O'Ryan did appear at his hearing, his attorney and witnesses were in 
another jurisdiction and unable to attend.l09 Similarly, Maldonado­
Perez had counsel located elsewhere. He also claimed to have wit­
nesses out of the jurisdiction, although as the majority noted, he never 
identified them. 110 In both cases, the immigration law judges were 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 341. 
102. Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1986). 
103. Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 340 n.4 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 340 n.5 (referring to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1362). Section 1362 provides that "the 
person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Gov­
ernment) by such counsel ... as he shall choose." 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988). 
107. Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 333. 
108. Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988). 
109. Id. at 1311. 
110. Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 334. 
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unimpressed, and the location of witnesses and counsel were consid­
ered insufficient reasons to grant a change of venue. However, the 
court of appeals in Castro-O'Ryan held that denial of this motion de­
nied the alien his statutory right to counse1. 1l1 Judge Wald deter­
mined that Maldonado-Perez was similarly denied the counsel of his 
choice. 
In conclusion, Judge Wald argued that the alien's need for a 
change of venue outweighed the court's administrative concerns, that 
the denial prevented him from being represented, and that it therefore 
was abuse of discretion to deny these motions. 112 Since the motions 
were in fact reasonable, she conCluded that MaldonadO-Perez was not 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be present, and his in absentia 
deportation "r[an] counter to the statutory purpose and to fundamen­
tal fairness."113 
III. ANALYSIS 
The majority opinion in Maldonado-Perez is characteristic of the 
scope ofjudicial protection given to most aliens in in absentia proceed­
ings, while the dissent illustrates that at least some jurists consider 
those protections insufficient. Appellate courts often defer to the im­
migration judge's determination of fact and law, although there must 
be fairness in INS proceedings. If the "INS's interpretation is reason­
able, in that it is consistent with the statutory language, legislative his­
tory, and purpose of the statute, [the courts] will not invalidate it."114 
Stated more cynically, "[i]n the canon of classical immigration law, 
judges should be seen-if absolutely necessary-but not heard."lls 
This deference to Congress and the INS dates back to the early case 
law,1l6 and was reiterated shortly after section 242(b) was enacted.ll7 
The Supreme Court in Galvan v. Press 118 held that "[t]he power of 
Congress over the admission of aliens and their right to remain is nec­
essarily very broad."1l9 Nevertheless, the courts have not abdicated 
111. Castro-O'Ryan, 847 F.2d at 1313. 
112. Maldonado-Perez, 865 F.2d at 341 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
113. Id. 
114. De Los Santos v. INS, 690 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1982); see Matter of Wong, 12 I. 
& N. Dec. 733, 735 (1968) (BIA relies upon immigration judge's findings of fact). 
115. Schuck, supra note 4, at 14. 
116. See. e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) ("That the 
government ... can exclude aliens ... is a proposition which we do not think open to 
controversy. "). 
117. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 530. 
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their role in assuring that the process is fundamentally fair. 
A. Fairness: Balancing of Interests and Flexible Due Process 
While courts often defer to immigration regulations, in Landon v. 
Plasencia,120 the Supreme Court refused to unquestioningly follow 
INS policy. In Landon, the Court outlined a balancing of interests test 
to determine if a procedure is fair. Mrs. Plasencia, a permanent resi­
dent alien, was detained while re-entering this country.121 She was 
charged with smuggling illegal aliens across the border,122 and eventu­
ally deported as an excludable alien. 123 She appealed, arguing that she 
should be treated under deportation procedures, which grant broader 
rights to aliens.124 Although agreeing that the INS was technically 
justified in treating her as excludable, the Court held that fairness re­
quired more procedural safeguards in this case than the usual exclu­
sionary proceeding. 
The constitutional sufficiency of [immigration] procedures ... 
varies with the circumstances. [T)he courts must consider the inter­
est at stake for the individual, the risk ofan erroneous deprivation of 
the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable 
value ofadditional or different procedural safeguards, and the inter­
est of the government in using the current procedures ....12S 
Thus, competing claims of superior interests and significant risks are 
critical issues in determining the fairness of an in absentia proceeding. 
Dean Verkuii has ranked the interests at stake for various types of 
aliens. 126 From these groupings, he argues for a "flexible due process" 
in immigration, based upon the interests at risk. 127 Those who would 
be denaturalized, i.e., have their citizenship stripped, are at risk of los­
ing liberty and property, and must be afforded the greatest judicial 
protection. Aliens seeking asylum are the next highest category need­
ing special due process protection. 
120. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 

121.. Id. at 23. 

122. Id. 
123. Id. at 25. 
124. Id. at 27. 
125. Id. at 34 (emphasis added). The concept of examining the hardship to the alien 
had been established prior to this case, but was expanded upon in this decision. See gener­
ally Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
126. Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1984). 
127. Id. at 1146. The concept of ftexible due process began with a series of Supreme 
Court decisions in the early 19708. For an overview of the concept, see Friendly, Some 
Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975). 
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[W]hen the threat of persecution is added the . . . entrant is seeking 
something beyond a new opportunity: she is seeking safety from 
oppression. Under these circumstances it is not simply a question of 
returning a person to the country which she left .... Thus, an ... 
entrant seeking asylum has higher interests than those presented by 
the typical applicant for admission. 128 
Under this theory, aliens seeking asylum would receive greater judicial 
protection, perhaps including greater latitude when their change of 
venue or continuance motions are reviewed. 
Since Landon, procedural fairness has necessitated a balancing of 
these risks and interests. 129 However, only in the Ninth Circuit has 
the court routinely held that an alien's interests outweigh the govern­
ment's administrative concerns. 130 In contrast, in Maldonado­
Perez,131 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the 
immigration judge's denial of the original change of venue motion be­
cause it "would cause undue delay since the case was scheduled to be 
heard on the merits; petitioner had local counsel ...; petitioner failed 
to identify any witnesses in the Washington area; and petitioner 
moved to Washington on his own accord."132 The immigration judge 
denied the second venue motion because of its late arrival and because 
no new arguments for a change of venue were presented. Again, the 
court's rationale was primarily administrative in nature. Apparently, 
the trial court still expected local Texas counsel to represent Maldo­
nado-Perez, even though Washington counsel argued that a motion to 
appear on the alien's behalf had accompanied the second change of 
venue motion. The Board of Immigration Appeals found no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's denial of either motion. "[O]ther than 
the implied inconvenience, the [petitioner] hard] not shown how he 
was harmed by the immigration judge's venue ruling. He hard] not 
named any witnesses he would have presented or any evidence he 
could have obtained only if the hearing had been held in Washington, 
D.C."133 The Board of Immigration Appeals, like the trial court, ap­
parently weighed the government's interest in judicial economy more 
heavily than the alien's unsubstantiated need to be represented by 
counsel closer to home, where witnesses were more available. The 
128. Verkuil, supra note 126, at 1151. 
129. See, e.g., Najaf-Ali v. Meese, 653 F. Supp. 833, 837 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
130. See Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988); Rios-Berrios v. INS, 
776 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1985); Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1978). 
131. 865 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
132. [d. at 335. 
133. [d. at 332 (quoting the BIA Decision at 3). 
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government's interest in judicial economy is significant. "The central 
reality of immigration administration is the overwhelming caseload on 
the ... immigration judges ...."134 Despite this issue, an alien's 
change of venue request to secure counsel has been held a reasonable 
request, and its denial harmful error. 13S 
B. 	 Asylum Claims Require a Different Analysis Than Other 
Deportation Actions 
Section 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
provides that the alien must have a reasonable opportunity to be pres­
ent, or must give a reasonable excuse for his absence.136 This analysis 
requires that the alien's claim be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 137 
Yet, in Maldonado-Perez, the immigration judge made no allowance 
for the fact that counsel was acting pro bono, or that he had been 
retained only one week earlier. Neither the trial court nor the court of 
appeals took special notice that this was a claim for asylum, despite 
the greater Personal risks to aliens fleeing repressive governments. 138 
The court of appeals merely analogized to Patel,139 a case that did not 
involve a claim for asylum. Patel was an alien accused of twice over­
staying a visa, and whose citizenship was from a country friendly to 
the United States. In contrast, Maldonado-Perez was a political refu­
gee from an unfriendly dictatorship. The majority passed over the 
substantially different facts, different interests, and different risks in­
volved in the two cases. Congress' rationale for including the in ab­
sentia process in the statutel40 is typified by Patel's delaying tactics. 
In absentia proceedings are thus more justifiable in Patel's case, where 
the alien overstayed his visa twice, requested a continuance to further 
extend his stay, and then did not appear when the continuances were 
denied. 
Despite the factual differences, and the different interests at stake, 
the law regarding in absentia proceedings has been applied equally to 
asylum claims and overstay deportations. The opportunity to be pres­
ent, or excused for being absent, is considered to be the same for both 
alien groups. While it can be argued that Congress itself made no 
distinction among types of aliens, it is equally arguable that the rea­
134. 	 Schuck, supra note 4, at 68. 
135. 	 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
136. 	 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
137. 	 Barthold v. INS, 517 F.2d 689, 691 (5th Cir. 1975). 
138. 	 See Verkuil, supra note 126, at 1151. 
139. 	 Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1986). 
140. 	 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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sonableness standards in the statute were incorporated for these situa­
tions.141 Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that Congress 
incorporated the in absentia power only to fight "obstructionist" and 
"contumacious" behavior by aliens.142 Those are strong words that 
create images of deliberate and rebellious aliens-repeat offenders 
caught abusing their statutory rights. The language seems harsh and 
misplaced when referring to political refugees, jurisdictionally bound 
to a court hundreds of miles from family and counsel, absent after the 
denial of any change of venue request. As Judge Wald argued in her 
dissent, the opportunity to be present must be real, and the facts sur­
rounding each alien's status should be considered when determining if 
the opportunity were available. 143 
Perhaps one reason that aliens were easily "lumped" together in 
the 1952 statute is that the types of aliens were not as different from 
each other then as they are today. "There have always been refugees 
... but the brutality of modern warfare, the ferocity of political strug­
gle, and the disruptiveness of social and economic changes have dra­
matically altered the scale of displacement and devastation."I44 Prior 
to 1980, no federal legislation dealing specifically with aliens seeking 
asylum existed. 14S Yet the numbers of aliens seeking asylum grew rap­
idly. For example, in three short years from 1978 to 1981, the number 
of aliens seeking asylum rose from 3,700 to over 50,000 annually.l46 
Patterns of immigration have changed, and as noted above, the differ­
ences among the types of aliens are great. Judging them under similar 
procedures may no longer be fundamentally fair. Therefore, deporta­
tion procedures require adaptation in order to maintain their useful­
ness. Without fairness in INS procedures, the alien's reasonable 
opportunity to be present is questionable. 
In Landon v. Plasencia,147 the Supreme Court promoted fairness 
through a balancing of risks and interests. On the one hand, courts 
and Congress have justifiable concerns that aliens will abuse the sys­
141. See supra note 35. 
142. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
143. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, J., 
dissenting). 
144. Schuck, supra note 4, at 39. 
145. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 20l(b), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codi­
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988». 
146. See Immigration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Ref­
ugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
576 (1981) [hereinafter Immigration Reform) (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Deputy Com­
missioner, INS). 
147. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
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tem and its protection. "The governmental interests in the processes 
surrounding immigration encompass complex concerns. In any mass 
justice situation there is an overriding interest in efficient and effective 
decisionmaking."148 Aliens enter at many border points and may relo­
cate miles away while awaiting their deportation hearing. Waiting for 
these indigent defendants to secure counsel might take years, if it oc­
curred at all. Changing venue every time an alien relocates could 
postpone his deportation indefinitely. Procedural safeguards could 
rule the system, acting as a weapon to be used to prolong and avoid 
the deportation process. "[T]he incentives for aliens to claim asylum 
are powerful, often overwhelming. Merely by filing the claim, an alien 
apprehended by the INS automatically wins a delay in deportation 
until all avenues of ... review have been exhausted."149 Court dockets 
are clogged now, and news travels fast. Some commentators have 
stated that our immigration laws generally allow abuse, and the 
message that "we do not have an adequate policy or an enforceable 
policy . . . has been received by the people who want to come to the 
United States-and there are many."I!!O 
On the other hand, the interests of aliens like Maldonado-Perez, 
Baires, and Castro-O'Ryan must be protected. "Many of these aliens, 
like many of our forebears, were driven from their original homelands 
by bigoted authorities who denied the existence of freedom and toler­
ance."l!!l Indigent and uneducated, they seek assistance from a system 
more easily accessed by the educated and affiuent. In many jurisdic­
tions, the paucity of pro bono assistance precludes many from ob­
taining counsel and ensures that the fortunate few receive only 
minimal support.1!I2 "It seems clear that there is an urgent need for 
some fundamental changes in the system. Delay is built into the 
existing structure."1!!3 For Maldonado-Perez, that meant an 
overburdened Texas attorney from Refugee Legal Services and a pro 
bono Washington counselor who should not have been expected to 
travel to Texas to represent him. The reasonableness of both the 
148. Verkuil, supra note 126, at 1153. 
149. Schuck, supra note 4, at 41. 
ISO. Immigration Reform, supra note 146, at 757 (statement of Robert Pastor, guest 
scholar, Brookings Inst.). 
151. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 166 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
152. Note, INS Transfer Policy: Interference with Detained Aliens' Due Process Right 
to Retain Counsel, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2001, 2005-06 n.25 (1987) (examining the inade­
quate resources available in some areas of the country where aliens are detained); see also 
Anonymous, Pro Bono Diary, 6 IMMIGR. J. 11 (Jan.-Mar. 1983) (in one day, attorney repre­
sented 26 aliens in court appearances). 
153. Roberts, supra note 46, at 15. 
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alien's and his attorney's actions must be examined in light of the fac­
tors endemic to the system. Court decisions like Baires 154 and Castro­
O'Ryan ISS demonstrate what happens when immigration judges begin 
to treat these motions routinely. In both cases, the court of appeals 
reversed the lower court, holding that refusing a reasonable change of 
venue motion denied the alien due process. The location of witnesses 
and counsel in a different jurisdiction should have been sufficient rea­
sons to grant the motions. 
The interests of all aliens are significant, but the interests of aliens 
seeking asylum are greater. 156 Just as procedural motions in criminal 
proceedings are treated differently between felonies and misdemean­
ors, asylum and stayover deportations should proceed under different 
standards. Stayover deportation proceedings like Pate/ 157 are facially 
fair. The alien was here on a visa, and had already overstayed the time 
limit twice. His motion was for a further continuance of his deporta­
tion case. Nevertheless, determinations of asylum claims in absentia 
are at best on the fringes of fairness. The risks to the alien are greater, 
and the need to hear from the alien regarding these risks is apparent. 
The objective of the statute, and a legitimate judicial goal, was to pre­
vent aliens from using procedural safeguards to obstruct justice. How­
ever, denials of all change of venue requests, while attaining that end, 
would be unnecessarily inflexible, and would deprive many aliens of 
justice. 
Three recommendations follow from the above concerns. First, 
there must be a greater appreciation of the differences between the 
various types of aliens, and their different interests. Second, changes 
are needed in the review of venue and continuance motions, which will 
ensure a greater opportunity for the alien to be present. Finally, in 
absentia proceedings should be reserved only for extreme situations. 
C. 	 Recommendations 
1. 	 Immigration Courts Should Consider the Alien's Status as 
a Factor in Determining if Pre-trial Procedural Motions 
Should Be Granted 
Refugees requesting asylum and stayovers who have breached 
their visa privileges are two distinctively different alien groups. 
Stayover adjudications are less factually complex, require fewer 
154. Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1988). 
155. Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988). 
156. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
157. Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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witnesses, and need less legal counseling. Stayovers who have been in 
this country, even for a short while, are more likely to be versed in our 
legal system and the resources available than are recent refugees. 
Whether on a traveling or working visa, stayovers are more inclined to 
have at least some financial resources to obtain counsel. 
However, political refugees have different interests. ISS They are 
fleeing repressive governments and must prove that threats to their 
safety exist in order to be granted asylum. ls9 They require witnesses 
and the aid of counsel. The risks involved in deportation are greater 
for these aliens, and in Landon, the Court's "fairness" demands that 
their interests be specifically weighed and balanced. Even the "flexible 
due process" approach would require a case-by-case analysis, which 
would consider the type of alien and degree of procedural protection 
warranted. 
2. 	 Change of Venue and Continuance Motions Should Be 
Temporarily Granted in Asylum Actions 
Under either the "fairness" or "flexible due process" theories, a 
presumption should exist in favor of granting change of venue and 
continuance motions in an asylum action when they involve aliens at­
tempting to present witnesses or secure the services of counsel. Con­
tinuances should be brief, with the alien required to return to court as 
often as necessary to demonstrate positive action and a need for addi­
tional time. Change of venue motions should be temporarily granted, 
pending evidence that the alien is moving forward in securing counsel 
and preparing a defense. The original court could review submitted 
affidavits to ensure the alien's compliance. In the interest of fairness, it 
is worth the original court's time to review these documents. After 
granting either motion, the court could quickly move to final adjudica­
tion, in absentia if necessary, where the alien fails to establish that he 
is making progress in his defense. This. system of short or temporary 
extensions would flush out the aliens using the system merely as a 
delaying tactic. 
Where there is only obstructionist behavior, one short delay or 
temporary venue change will not greatly burden the system. Where 
the alien's requests were honestly motivated, however, justice will be 
better served by an initial "benefit of the doubt" approach to these 
motions. The courts' concerns for administrative efficiency, although 
158. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
159. 8 C.P.R. § 208.5 (1990). 
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significant, should not automatically preclude an alien's attempt to 
prove his need for a change of venue. 
3. 	 In Absentia Proceedings Should Be Reserved for Extreme 
Situations, Especially in Asylum Cases 
Finally, where the alien alleges he is a political refugee, the "bal­
ancing" of risks and interests indicates that in absentia proceedings 
should be reserved for only the most extreme situations. While all 
deportable aliens have an option to designate where they wish to be 
deported, those who have overstayed a visa probably have a safer ha­
ven at home or elsewhere than political refugees. Arguably, political 
refugees would be victims of persecution at home, and may be unsafe 
in many of the countries that would accept them. In the balancing 
equation, the interest at stake for the alien is conceivably life itself. 
Furthermore, the risk of error, in our adversarial system, is greatest 
when no one is present to offer an opposing view. In contrast, the 
government's interest in efficient utilization of court resources is only 
slightly impeded by the short delays outlined above, especially consid­
ering that every alien does not assert refugee status. Considering that 
the risks of error are greatest when an alien is deported without an 
opportunity to make his case, the court's in absentia power should be 
reserved for cases where there is evidence of obstructionist intent by 
the alien. 
CONCLUSION 
These recommendations should not be read to condemn all in ab­
sentia proceedings. Where it has been established that the system is 
being used'simply to delay, the courts should proceed without the 
alien, that action being reviewable by a federal court of appeals. How­
ever, before a person's rights are stripped, the government should first 
demonstrate that that was the only reasonable alternative left. 
Although deportation is a civil action, the consequences to the alien 
are frequently as severe as to the criminal defendant. For that reason, 
the courts have established requirements of procedural fairness. Just 
as we rarely adjudicate against criminal defendants in absentia, so too 
should we sparingly use that power to deport aliens absent from their 
hearings. 
Timothy W. Murphy 
